Abstract: National policy is shaped through frequent interaction between the Court and Congress. The Court devotes the largest portion of its work to applying and interpreting congressional statutes. Congress considers these interpretations in future legislation. The Court's use of judicial review to nullify acts of Congress is one of the most contentious aspects of this relationship. However, the interaction that occurs after judicial review is often ignored. When trying to understand Court-Congress relations, it is important to note Congress often overrides Court decisions. Historically the Court rarely rules against Congress. From 1791-2010 the Court nullified just 167 acts of Congress-an average of less than one-a-year. However, this type of interaction has rapidly increased. Nearly 60 percent of all federal laws struck down have occurred since 1960. The Rehnquist Court alone is responsible for nearly 25 percent of all nullified federal laws. Understandably, the rapid acceleration in judicial activity has renewed fears of an imperial judiciary. These fears are partly based in the incorrect assumption that policy development ends with judicial review. The results of this study indicate that as the Court has become more active in striking down congressional acts, Congress has increasingly resorted to overriding these decisions. This study also indicates that increased instances of judicial review suggest changing trends in Court-Congress relations rather than signifying judicial finality.
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I. Introduction-
National policy in the United States is shaped through a complex process involving frequent interaction between the Supreme Court and Congress. The Court devotes the largest portion of its work to applying and interpreting congressional statutes.
1 Congress carefully considers these interpretations in future legislative action. The Court's use of judicial review to nullify acts of Congress is one of the most contentious and discussed aspects of this relationship. However, the interaction that occurs after judicial review is often ignored. When trying to understand Court-Congress relations, it is important to note that Congress often overrides Court decisions that hold federal laws unconstitutional. This post judicial review activity is an increasingly important component to maintaining an equilibrium between judicial and legislative powers.
From a historical perspective the Court rarely rules against Congress. For example, from 1791-2010 the Supreme Court declared just 167 acts of Congress unconstitutional-an average of less than one per year. 2 With so few examples, it is not surprising that few quantitative studies have examined on Congress's rate of response to these decisions. However, this interaction between the two branches has rapidly increased. Nearly 60 percent of all federal laws struck down by the Court have occurred in the last fifty years. The Rehnquist Court alone is responsible for nearly 25 percent of all nullified federal laws. 3 Understandably, the rapid acceleration in judicial activity has renewed fears of an imperial judiciary. However, these fears are partly based in the incorrect assumption that the complex process of policy development suddenly ends with judicial review. Surprisingly, this recent flurry of Court activity has not spurred increased quantitative scholarship into the area of congressional overrides of constitutional-interpretation-decisions. The results of this study indicate that as the Court has become more active in striking down congressional acts, Congress has increasingly resorted to overriding these decisions. In fact, this study identified that 29.3 percent of the acts of Congress that were struck down by the Rehnquist Court were later overridden (at least in part) by future congressional legislation. This is a significantly higher percentage of overrides then found in previous studies examining constitutional-interpretation-overrides. These results indicate that increased judicial activity nullifying federal law is suggestive of changing trends in CourtCongress relations, rather than a signal of judicial finality. Ultimately this paper argues that judicial finality-the theory that the Supreme Court has the final word in constitutional interpretation-is incorrect. Congress and the Court interact in the policy making process even after judicial review; this increase in post judicial review activity shows that an equilibrium in Court-Congress relations is still being maintained, however, this maintenance emanates from a evolved process from previous decades.
This paper first examines some theories of Court-Congress relations. I argue that theories of judicial finality, the countermajoritarian nature of the Court, and "rational choice,"
as well as studies on court-curbing and decision reversals would all benefit from more fully considering constitutional-interpretation-overrides. Since judicial review and constitutionalinterpretation-overrides are becoming increasingly common, the lack of study in this area limits understanding of modern Court-Congress relations. In order to assist scholarship in this area, this study generates a dataset of all acts of Congress nullified during the Rehnquist Court (see appendix I). This dataset is then compared with the frequency of nullified federal law between the Rehnquist, Brennan, and Warren Courts to identify emerging trends. The dataset is also examined for presence of congressional overrides to Rehnquist Court decisions overturning federal law. The resulting data is used to add to current Court-Congress theories and assist in understanding the changing nature of this relationship.
II. Exploring Some Theories on Court Congress Relations
Judicial Finality and the Countermajoritarian Dilemma 
In Murphy and Pritchett's view this "magic" essentially made Court decisions final, despite
Congress's constitutional powers over the Courts. Modern scholarly advocates of judicial supremacy make claims ranging from normative arguments that judicial supremacy should exist to empirical based observations that it is the most important step in interpreting the Constitution. 7 In 2004, longtime judicial affairs correspondent for the New York Times, Linda
Greenhouse, argued that that the Court's frequency in overturning acts of Congress in recent years empirically supports the existence of judicial finality. 10 Scholars point out that counter majoritarian dilemma holds true even if the majority will is frustrated to ensure protection of individual and minority rights. To quote Robert Dahl on this matter "to affirm that the Court supports minority preferences against majorities is to deny that popular sovereignty and political equality, at least in the traditional sense, exist in the United States; and to affirm that the Court ought to act in this way is to deny that popular sovereignty and political equality ought to prevail in this country." Robert A. Lincoln's First Inaugural Address March 4, 1861 "if the policy of the government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers" 12 Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy," 285. 13 Dahl further backs up his argument that the Court is rarely counter majoritarian for long by using the example of Roosevelt and the New Deal hostilities over the Court rulings. Based on a new Justice being appointed every twenty-two months it stands that "Generalizing over the whole history of the Court, the chances are about one out of five that that a president will make one appointment to the Court in less than a year, better than one out of two that he will make one within two years, and three out of four that he will make one within three years. Mr. Roosevelt had unusually bad luck: he had to wait four years for his first appointment; the odds against this long an interval are four to one. With average luck, the battle with the Court would never have occurred." 285.
therefore the lag time between appointments) increase. In the absence of other congressional checks on the Court, longer terms would equate to increased judicial power. Congress debating an override. Rational choice models are often built with the assumption that the Court will never get another chance to interpret an override, so the dialogue between the branches suddenly stops. 25 Like all models, rational choice theory simplifies reality to help explain reality. However, some components of the Court-Congress relationship might be so distorted by rational choice models that the distortion makes them counterproductive. The examination of constitutional-interpretation-overrides helps expose some of these distortions. 24 Baum and Hausegger, "The Supreme Court and Congress," 107-122. Further, some of these studies argue that the few overrides that do occur, occur because of the Court's desire, or its "invitations," to be overridden. 25 If the Court has a policy preference it could be argued that the Court will base its initial decision on its most preferred outcome and if the decisions is overridden the court could overrule the new statute based on a strategic model. One is as able to start their assumptions here as with the assumptions inherent in rational choice modeling.
Lack of Study of Constitutional-Interpretation-Overrides
There are important differences between constitutional and statutory interpretation. In a statutory decision, for example, the power is presumed to be with Congress. 26 In a constitutional decision, it is often assumed that unless Congress works to amend the Judicial finality, the countermajoritarian nature of the Court, and rational choice theories are all easier to justify if constitutional-interpretation-overrides occur as rarely (or even less often as some many assume) as statutory interpretation ones. However, the few studies focused on constitutional-interpretation-overrides indicate the exact opposite.
Constitutional-interpretation-overrides occur more frequently than overrides to statutory interpretation decisions. However, since Dahl cherry-picked cases for ones holding "major-legislation" unconstitutional it is hard to know how representative his results are of the entire universe of cases available to be overridden. In 1994 Ignagni and Meernik's completed a rare example of a quantitative study purely focused on constitutional-interpretation-overrides, examining all overrides based in constitutional interpretation from . 35 Ignagni and Meernik found that 20 percent of Supreme Court cases nullifying federal federal laws were later modified by Congress. 36 Again, the results of a constitutional-interpretation-override study deviated substantially from the results of statutory override studies. The results from these two studies, and the few like them, imply a rejection of judicial finality in constitutional interpretation and also challenge to notion that Congress has an easier time of overriding statutory interpretation cases. These studies also 32 This limited the dataset from seventy-eight cases down to thirty-eight. 33 Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy," 290. 34 Part of the increased percentage could be attributed to him only looking at the cases most likely to be reversed. However even if all seventy-eight cases of the Court ruling an act of Congress unconstitutional were included and there was not another example of a reversal that would still produce a reversal rate of 24%--some four times higher than what most statutory studies show. 35 Ignagni and Meernik, "Explaining Congressional Attempts," 353-71. 38 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 39 It is expected that accidental overrides, legislation that was not primarily intended to override the Supreme Court, but still does so will be missed using this method. This is appropriate as the focus of the study is Congress being able to pass overrides when it intends.
40 Two previous studies looked at the first part of the Rehnquist Court but combined those years with the Warren and Burger Courts. Ignagni and Meernik, "Explaining Congressional Attempts" looks at 1954 -1990 and Pickerill, Constitutional Deliberation, looks at 1954 -1997 . Warren (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) 16 years 20 1.25 Burger (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) 17 years 32 1.88 Rehnquist (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) When evaluating the level of conflict between the two branches the age of the legislation is relevant. It is often theorized that the Court is more willing to strike down older congressional legislation-giving deference to recently enacted laws. This is justified on the basis that legislation passed by previous Congresses may no longer be supported by the current majority. Thus, it is thought, the Court is less likely to nullify laws recently adopted by Congress.
IV. Survey Results-

Frequency of Judicial Review
The activity of the Rehnquist Court directly challenges this notion. Of the forty-one congressional acts struck down by the Rehnquist Court, 39 percent were adopted less than five years previously-only 27 percent were adopted more than fifteen years before the Court struck them down. This is in sharp contrast to the Warren Court where only 10 percent were recent acts of Congress with 30 percent adopted sixteen or more years before. Likewise, the Burger Court was more likely to strike down federal laws passed sixteen or more years ago than ones adopted in the last five years (see The cases above show that Congress will pass overriding legislation even when the Court does not offer an invitation. The cases also illustrate that the interaction between the Court and Congress is more complicated than the Court nullifying federal law and Congress contemplating an override-this process can sometimes go multiple rounds. This seems to pose a challenge to the notion that justices always act strategically, or at least always successfully, to avoid overrides. This process shows that judicial finality is a myth, and the process also indicates that increased judicial activity nullifying federal law does not automatically signal judicial supremacy.
If Congress is increasing its rate of constitutional-interpretation-overrides in reaction to
increased Court activity, this is a sign of Congress shifting its constraints on the Court from before-the-fact appointment controls (as described by Dahl) to after-the-fact overrides of Court This was followed by the Burger Court that nullified federal law at four times the pre-1953 rate.
In all, the Rehnquist Court struck down forty-one federal laws, the greatest total of federal statutes overturned in any nineteen-year period. The prohibition in section 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935 on the display of alcohol content on beer labels is inconsistent with the protections afforded to commercial speech by the First Amendment. The government's interest in curbing strength wars among brewers is substantial, but, given the ''overall irrationality' of the regulatory scheme, the labeling prohibition does not directly and materially advance that interest. 
US v. IBM Corp (1996)
A federal tax on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers not subject to the federal income tax violates the Export Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, as applied to casualty insurance for losses incurred during the shipment of goods from locations within the United States to purchasers abroad. 
Dickerson v. United States (2000)
A section of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of1968 purporting to reinstate the voluntariness principle that had governed the constitutionality of custodial interrogations prior to the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 486 (1966) , is an invalid attempt by Congress to redefine a constitutional protection defined by the Court. The warnings to suspects required by Miranda are constitution-based rules. While the Miranda Court invited a legislative rule that would be ''at least as effective'' in protecting a suspect's right to remain silent, section 3501 is not an adequate substitute.
57 All information regarding acts held unconstitutional was taken directly from: U.S. Senate, The Constitution: Analysis and Interpretation 2008 Supplement, 163-4; U.S. Senate, The Constitution: Acts of Congress Held Unconstitutional 2002, 2117-59. All cases from this dataset were entered into GPO Access' new Federal Digital System database called FDSYS. Using the "advanced search" function, all cases were checked for their appearance in "Congressional Bills," "Congressional Record," "History of Bills," and "Congressional Hearings." Each match was examined for bills intentionally introduced to respond to a Supreme Court case. Each identified bill number was then searched in the Library of Congress' database (Thomas.loc.gov) to establish the legislative history of the bill. 
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television (1988)
Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act, which authorizes a copyright owner to recover statutory damages, in lieu of actual damages, ''in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just,'' does not grant the right to a jury trial on the amount of statutory damages. The Seventh Amendment, however, requires a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. (5)).
United States v. Hatter (2001)
The 1983 extension of the Social Security tax to then-sitting judges violates the Compensation Clause of Article III, § 1. The Clause ''does not prevent Congress from imposing a non-discriminatory tax laid generally upon judges and other citizens . . . , but it does prohibit taxation that singles out judges for specially unfavorable treatment.'' The 1983 Social Security law gave 96% of federal employees ''total freedom'' of choice about whether to participate in the system, and structured the system in such a way that ''virtually all'''' of the remaining 4% of employees -except the judges -could opt to retain existing coverage. By requiring thensitting judges to join the Social Security System and pay Social Security taxes, the 1983 law discriminated against judges in violation of the Compensation Clause. (1997) . There the mandated assessments were ''ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy,'' while here there is ''no broader regulatory system in place.'' The mushroom program contains no marketing orders that regulate how mushrooms may be produced and sold, no exemption from the antitrust laws, and nothing else that forces mushroom producers to associate as a group to make cooperative decisions. But for the assessment for advertising, the mushroom growing business is unregulated. Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required cable TV operators that offer channels primarily devoted to sexually oriented programming to prevent signal bleed either by fully scrambling those channels or by limiting their transmission to designated hours when children are less likely to be watching, violates the First Amendment. The provision is content-based, and therefore can only be upheld if narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest. The measure is not narrowly tailored, since the Government did not establish that the less restrictive alternative found in section 504 of the Act --that of scrambling a channel at a subscriber's request --would be ineffective.
36) Act of Apr. 9, 1996, 110 Stat. 1200 (Pub. L. 104-130), 2 U.S.C. § § 691 et seq.
Clinton v. City of New York (1998)
The Line Item Veto Act, which gives the President the authority to ''cancel in whole'' three types of provisions that have been signed into law, violates the Presentment Clause of Article I, section 7. In effect, the law grants to the President ''the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes.'' This Line Item Veto Act authority differs in important respects from the President's constitutional authority to ''return'' (veto) legislation: the statutory cancellation occurs after rather than before a bill becomes law, and can apply to a part of a bill as well as the entire bill.
37) Act of Apr. 26, 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-134 § 504(a) (16)), 110 Stat. 1321-55.
Legal Services Corp. v. Valazquez (2001)
A restriction in the appropriations act for the Legal Services Corporation that prohibits funding for any organization that participates in litigation that challenges a federal or state welfare law constitutes viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. Moreover, the restrictions on LSC advocacy ''distort [the] usual functioning'' of the judiciary, and are ''inconsistent with accepted separation-of-powers principles.'' ''An informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar,'' yet the restriction ''prohibits speech and expression on which courts must depend for the proper exercise of judicial power.'' *38) Act of Sep. 30, 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121) , 110 Stat. 3009-26, 18 U.S.C. § § 2252, 2256.
* Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002)
Two sections of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 that extend the federal prohibition against child pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but that were produced without using any real children violate the First Amendment. These provisions cover any visual image that ''appears to be'' of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and any image promoted or presented in a way that ''conveys the impression'' that it depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. The rationale for excepting child pornography from First Amendment coverage is to protect children who are abused and exploited in the production process, yet the Act's prohibitions extend to ''virtual'' pornography that does not involve children in the production process. The government failed to demonstrate that the advertising restriction is ''not more extensive than is necessary'' to serve its interest in preventing the drug compounding exemption from becoming a loophole by which large-scale drug manufacturing can avoid the FDA drug approval process. There are several non-speech means by which the government might achieve its objective. 
United States v. Booker (2005)
Two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, one that makes the Guidelines mandatory, and one that sets forth standards governing appeals of departures from the mandatory Guidelines, are invalidated. The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial limits sentence enhancements that courts may impose pursuant to the Guidelines.
